Kids Company – Reserves of Discomfort

150807_KCReserves

The Financial Times  provides a good understanding of some of the financial woes that beset Kid Company.

As the article shows, Kids Company had only £400k in reserves at the end of 2013 and its Trustees wrote in their audited accounts that this was a major risk.
The Founder says that she argued with Government that they should do more (i.e. give more) to help this situation but Kids Company received over £12 million in 2013 of voluntary unrestricted income. This means that Kids Company management (and the Board of Trustees) decided themselves how to allocate the money between active use and reserves. The Government (at least in this instance) had no burden upon it to allocate money to reserves – Kids Company had adequate funding to do this and should have made this allocation for the benefit of the future of the organisation, its mission and the kids that it supports.

It decided to fund short-term need (always pressing) against long-term viability and got away with that for a long time. Eventually, like a business that overtrades, it goes bust. That is making your organisation unsustainable and for an organisation of this size with this amount of voluntary unrestricted funding (a level that so many well-run charities would welcome) to commit this offence is maddening – it is anger inducing.
For the auditors to simply then sign off the accounts with no comment is appalling. The Trustees knew the situation and commented on it in the accounts in 2013. They were not (yet) insolvent but could read the runes. The auditors should have commented further.
For Government to keep putting money in without understanding the financial problems and not requiring Kids Company to allocate resources to reserves is unsettling. Surely someone in Government could have spoken to a charity finance person and understood the reserves issue (plainly in front of them) and made it a requirement of their funding to have Kids Company allocate more of their voluntary unrestricted income to reserves. Nothing appears to have happened.

This is not unusual in the sector – urgent needs are there to be met and Trustees not strong enough to argue for longer term needs. Trustees have a legal responsibility not just to write sentences in the accounts but to safeguard the organisation from collapse that they could have averted.

Six months’ breathing space at a lower level of operations could have allowed Kids Company to have resurfaced and kids and families still could be getting support in some of the UK’s hardest hit areas. Management and Trustees should look to themselves and no one else for the answers to problems in such a situation; auditors should be more pro-active; Government more discerning.

For the Charity sector as a whole, understanding the need for reserves and the prevention of “over-trading” is a fundamental need. Many Trustees are not up to understanding this requirement; many management staff are unsure how to balance the urgent needs of their beneficiaries in the short-term with those of organisational sustainability. Unfortunately, that is their job. The Charity Sector is not good at this – and every Charity is different. The mission of most charities are worthy enough for Trustees and senior management (and finance people) to try to learn something from this – reserves are not just for show, they have a place in sustaining charities and mitigating risk. It is not enough just to know you have a risk – a charity must take action.

Finally, it is a sad reflection on our times and our country that Kids Company had to undertake its mission in the first place. Its Founder was right in that she saw Government abstaining from its legitimate role in society – a 21st Century society not a 19th Century one. This abstinence then propelled Government (Labour and Conservative) into its Big Society mission – like a wealthy philanthropist giving money to the starving poor. This is Dickensian in the extreme and Kids Company should not have been needed. Many charities do work which are above what we would consider Government to be properly able to do – I suspect that some of the outcome of this will be that in this Dickensian, 19th Century Age of Austerity, we need to reflect more pro-actively on what we ask Charities to do and what we expect from the State.

The Reality of Governance

Attended the ACEVO Governance Commission Consultation Session 4

today (30 May). Good group of highly motivate people – mainly CEO’s. I provided the following paper at the end to the Commission – sums up my views on Charity Governance and the problem the current governance framework employs with a two-tier system trying to fit into a unitary legal framework. My response is to put CEO’s into Boards (as is the case with ACEVO).

The Reality of Governance

Grant Thornton in its Charity Governance Review 2013 – the Science of Good Governance – does not mention Chief Executives once.

They fall into the trap that governance “experts” so often do when writing about the charity / not for profit sector and the trap that the designers of governance law and rules have done since the beginning. The trap is that those entrusted with legal responsibility for such organisations can supposedly carry out their role as non-executives and any executives are deemed unnecessary to the process (or subordinated within the process as the “governed”) – indeed, in the legalistic set-up and the advice proffered to boards, chief executives are deemed risky on the board because of conflicts of interest – as the governed they hinder governance.

This separation of executive from non-executive is a divisive separation that inhibits good governance in the real world. The separation is really a throw-back to the 19th Century when wealthy philanthropists required administrators to disburse their funds. It has no place in the 21st Century except in very small charities (which are probably too small to have a CEO anyway). Elsewhere, having the Chief Executive on the Board should be seen as a natural requirement for reasons as follows:

1.     The Board cannot escape the charge of not being aware of issues as the Chief Executive will be part of the Board

2.     This is, in reality, the only way that Boards can be sufficiently aware of activities that impact governance

3.     The Board becomes “collegiate” with the development of real common cause

4.     The “upstairs / downstairs” mentality of the 19th Century is swapped for adult and more up-to-date dialogue

5.     Chief Executives will have to rise to the occasion so that they better understand the requirements and responsibilities of the Board rather than make proposals to the Board (as a servant of the Board) – even if, in reality, a CEO is probably in law as responsible as anyone for those decisions.

Unitary or two-tier boards?

There is also a continuous debate between the desirability of unitary and two-tier boards and it is believed that most charities (almost all) have decided on the second – whereas in most corporate Anglo-Saxon organisations (and public sector) the unitary board is by far the most common.

There are a few major errors within this view.

For there to be a two-tier board structure, there needs to be a legal distinction between the legal responsibilities of the two boards. In the UK, there is none so  that Charities that decide to form themselves of completely non-executives maintain a unitary structure but then devolve executive or operational decision-making to a team of executives – who are not enshrined in any legal context.

This team of executives (usually known as a Senior Management Team or SMT) has no specific legal framework outside of individual terms and conditions of employment. The SMT rarely has a framework of organization outside of an organization chart and has very few legally acknowledged responsibilities.

In the majority of charities, the most that exists is a tacit agreement between the Board (made up of non-executives) and the Chief Executive for the latter to carry out operational or “day to day” functions while the Board does governance.

This is not the two-tier legal structure known in German corporates, for example, which have defined legal status for both boards.

In the UK Charity set-up, only the main Board has legal status and is one reason why Grant Thornton do not mention the second “board” (as there isn’t one) or the Chief Executive at all!

The Responsibility Split

As a result of the ill-defined make-up of the Unitary Board in the UK Charity Sector, the split between the Board of non-executives and the management is also very ill-defined.

The Charity Commission spends much time on the responsibilities of the Board and states that there is an inherent problem in having Chief Executives on the Board of reasons of conflict of interest. However, the Charities commission does not state that Chief Executives should not be on the Board – which they can as long as Articles of Association allow this or Charities Commission approval is obtained.

Conflicts over, for example, salaries of the CEO can easily be handled by the CEO leaving the room (as it does in the Education Sector where Academy Chief Execs / Principals or School Heads – who are ex-officio on the Board – manage perfectly adequately).

However, the message is that Chief Executives are not normally on a Board. This message is just allowed to resonate around the sector – that there are so many conflicts between governance and operational management that it is better for the CEO to not be on the Board – the 19th Century mantra. This is not realistic. The conflict of interest issue is important – but, that is true for any member of the Board. Being non-executive does not mean that conflicts of interest don’t arise. Newly formed boards in the health sector are finding that there is a great deal of conflict where board members may have other interests in suppliers, for example.

The second reason for a completely non-executive board is unstated by the Charity Commission but often raised – the potential for undue influence by the Chief Executive if he / she is a Board member.

It is held that this one person would yield great(er) influence if he / she did not just attend Board meetings but also had a vote (one vote out of ten plus on the Board).

This is also unrealistic as a vote in itself is not the essence of the board membership. Chief Executives will not become more or less overbearing if hey have a vote – as is explained below. Governance remains the Board’s duty and legal responsibility – whether one vote is held by an executive manager or not.

The Tenuous Link

In the current split of responsibilities, the supposed two-tier Board structure (which is really only one plus an SMT) is completely reliant on the Chair of Trustees / Directors forming an excellent relationship with the Chief Executive (who heads up the SMT).

This requires the Chair to be up-to-speed on all things relevant to the legal requirements of the Board – an impossible task – in both directions.

This usually results in the Chair requiring the Chief Executive to provide a range of facilities to the Board – including induction, information provision and the like – so that the Board can attempt to be well enough educated to be able to carry out its responsibilities.

This is a tenuous link.

Worse, the Board has, in many organisations, retained so-called strategic responsibilities so that only operational requirements can be passed on to the SMT. This split of responsibilities is, again, a throw-back to the 19th Century where wealthy philanthropists entrusted administrators with passing out money on their wishes.

With far more charity complexity, the thought that non-executives actually “do strategy” is of great concern. 20th Century management thinking moved on from this separation in the 1930’s. It is well understood that strategy and operations are two sides of the same organizational coin and cannot be separated.

A recognized alternative may make sense as in the Carver model. “In the Carver Model, the board is responsible for ‘ends’, the difference the charity is seeking to make, for whom and at what cost. The CEO and the staff team are responsible for ‘means’, the actions which are taken to deliver the ‘ends’. John Carver talks about governance as ‘moral ownership’ one step down rather than one step up from management. He sees board leadership as meeting the wishes of the moral owners in compliance with laws and regulations. The role of the paid staff is to make the wishes of trustees’ happen.”

Carver does not recommend that CEO’s be on the Board but the concept that Carver proposes is so far away from current models – he views the CEO as completely central and Boards having the essence of the charity and governance and then asking the CEO to do everything else – that it is not consistent.

Current Boards are uncertain in their remit, usually go overboard in micromanagement and wanting to “do strategy”, often wanting to bypass the CEO in finding out information (i.e. do not put sufficient trust in the office of CEO).

This means that the viability of the Charity rests upon the tenuous link between Chair and CEO. The former, part of a non-executive Board; the latter (who does not in most cases report to the Chair) head of an SMT. The only legal link is in the CEO’s contract – a reporting line to the Board (who then often give this to the Chair).

This is a tenuous link and CEO’s often find this very difficult.

The Work Split between Board and Management

There is no constancy at all in any Board. Many see (as do NCVO) that the Board does strategy and the CEO and his / her team does “day to day”. This is out of date and harmful.

From a vision of the organization (usually the cause developed by the Founders and then provided as a legacy to the Board), a strategy has to be developed. This is clear. However, modern management thinking is uniform in its agreement that strategy and implementation need to be done by the senior management. This may require confirmation from the Board but then is the essence of good management and the ability of management to implement this strategy with the rest of the workforce. There is no sense in any advice from Charities Commission or elsewhere that this is understood.

Any charity where the Board does the strategy and the CEO picks it up and hopes to implement it is going against all best practice. The CEO is central to developing strategy – as is the SMT.

This is why, in reality, the SMT does the strategy based on the vision guided to them by the Board / Founders. SMT then has a job to sell this into the Board.

The main functions of the Board are not disrupted in this way. However, the link between Board and Management may be.

CEO on the Board

Those involved in governance thinking (Carver is a good example) believe that CEO’s should not be on the board for reasons of conflict of interest (or self-interest). In addition, they believe that there are better ways to make CEO’s feel good about themselves – i.e. the provision of sufficient prestige.

This misses out the very positive aspects of Board membership that the legalistic aspects of governance misrepresent but are fairly clear-cut in the real world.

What are these positive aspects?

1.     The Board is responsible legally and morally for the Charity. Yet, it is supposed to devolve almost every requirement of the organization to the management team – which is not even noted in law (i.e. it is a unitary Board when it thinks it is a two-tier system). In the absence of a proper framework, having the CEO on the Board provides an opportunity to ensure that the Management Team is at least unified in its legal responsibilities with the Board.

2.     Strategically, the Board is ill-equipped to understand what strategy is played out. Ensuring the CEO is involved (and votes for the strategy) ensures that the Board is unified in terms of collective agreement in terms of direction and implementation.

3.     The separation of Board and SMT (i.e. no linkage) is weak and offers a subservience that having the CEO on the Board would lessen.

4.     The rationale for Boards is to do three things (Charity Commission): Compliance, Prudence and Care. These are things that the CEO has to be central to.

5.     The CEO probably (in law) acts as a Shadow Trustee anyway. This means that the CEO is as responsible as any Trustee for the actions of the Charity but has no vote at all in Board meetings. This is responsibility without any representation and often leads to conflict.

The negative issues brought up are:

1.     conflict of interest – the Remunerations and Nominations Committee of individual charities can be properly asked to rule on this. Beyond salaries,  there is rarely an issue that comes up where conflict arises as a result of the CEO being a Trustee. Whether on issues like the approval of budgets or strategy, appointment of new Trustees or whatever, the CEO is normally heavily involved and a vote solidifies the process.

2.     Over-bearing CEOs – an over-bearing CEO will be the same whether on the Board or not. It is for the Board to ensure that none of its members outlast their value and this is a key requirement for the Chair.

3.     Governance and the ability to take the CEO to task for performance issues will be reduced – the CEO is a key member of the organization whether on the Board or not. Being able to vote on an issue does not reduce the roles of the Board. Where there is a serious issue with the Chief Executive, then this would be initially an issue for the Chair and possibly the Remuneration and Nominations Committee to handle. Any issue on the future of the Chief Executive would rule that person out of voting.

Other information

Charity Commission / ACEVO viewpoint

The Charity Commission seems to want to defend the status quo (where, according to an ACEVO report from 2007, around 5.2% of CEO’s were Trustees of that organisation).

The CC points out the dangers of conflict of interest over salary and similar issues. This is overcome everywhere else where committees are set up independently of the CEO as required and where CEO’s are asked to leave the room if there is a conflict (as conflict would be dealt with for anyone in such a situation).

The CC has no real view on this issue but also points out bureaucratically to watch out that the Articles don’t prohibit the change – which ours don’t.

ACEVO

In a 2007 report:

There was support for the following initiatives:

1. A code of good practice on governance (98% chief executives, 95% chairs).

2. Regular review of governance practices by external experts (68% chief executives,58% chairs).

3. More flexibility with respect to board structures (50% chief executives and 33% chairs thought that chief executives should be voting trustees).

 

It goes on:

The role of the chief executive as a bridge – by Paddy Fitzgerald

In the third sector the general practice is for trustee boards where normally trustees are non-executive, chaired by an independent and with the chief executive, who is rarely a trustee, in attendance. Here the primary concerns of the trustees are the mission and future of the organisation, while shorter term issues are for the most part dealt with by a management committee chaired by the chief executive.

 

If this model is to work, the chief executive becomes the bridge between the future concerns of the trust and the short-term issues of the management committee. Most importantly, the chief executive will be responsible for overseeing the journey from short to long term and in deploying management resources to explore this and identify the issues along the way. In this way the chief executive brings to the attention of the trust shorter term questions requiring resolution, and engages the executive staff in the consideration of longer term matters.

 

This is a much more powerful vision than one of the chief executive as a non trustee

passively awaiting the instructions of his or her board. The bridge role requires positive engagement with the ability to exert powerful advocacy in both trust and management committee, and as leadership becomes less and less a matter of autocratic direction and more and more a matter of persuasion and shared endeavour, so it becomes vital that the chief executive is an inclusive member of both trust and management committee.

 

Trusts too should value the extra dimension provided by the sense of a unified team, and should welcome the chief executive as one of their own, for it is under these circumstances that the chief executive is most likely to engage other trustees most, chief executives cannot escape legal obligations placed on trustees since they will be judged as shadow directors with the same penalties in the event of any major problem, so it is in their interests to don the mantle of a Trustee and participate wholly.

 

The conclusion may be that the formal appointment as a trustee aids the chief executive in this bridge role and is one of the defining characteristics of the third sector. Recognition of this role for the chief executive is essential to staff appraisal and through this to the management and leadership programmes aimed at staff development and management succession.

 

 

On its FAQ’s – current – ACEVO lists the types of Board structure:

 

Q: What is the appropriate level of executive involvement in governance?

A: This relates to the structure of organisational boards. Board structures fall into four categories:

  1. The wholly executive board: found most often in small commercial companies. For obvious reasons, such boards usually struggle to offer any independent scrutiny of executive decisions. Such boards are rarely found in the non-profit sector, and it is unlikely that the Charity Commission would permit such a structure for registered charities.
  2. The two-tier board: found in parts of Europe, comprises a ‘supervisory board’ to represent stakeholder interests, and an ‘operational board’ to drive the organisation’s performance. Some charity boards may in practice resemble this structure, delegating operational decisions to a ‘senior management team’. However, a genuine operational board, unlike a senior management team, has a legally recognised governance role.
  3. The unitary board: classic model for business in the UK and Commonwealth countries, includes both executive and non-executive directors, with equal status. Despite the ambiguity concerning executive directors’ role, this model is recommended by many experts on corporate governance. The structure embodies the tension between conformance and performance. If working properly, it can combine executives’ detailed knowledge of the business with the more detached scrutiny of non-executives.
  4. The wholly non-executive board: found commonly in commercial companies based in the USA as well as in the British third sector. Third sector board member are usually, but not always, unpaid.
  5. Recognising that no one model will be perfect for every organisation, ACEVO recommends that its members conduct an audit of their governance arrangements, which should include an examination of governance structures as well as good practice.

ACEVO has not formally proposed a major change and has not acted on this serious issue – although it has a Reform Group which highlights the issue – http://www.acevo.org.uk/Policy+Advocacy/Activity/Governance . However, it is clear to me that the practice of CEO’s not being on the board is a serious deficiency and one that should be rectified across the board.

 

ACEVO – POLICY: UNITARY BOARDS

(From the ACEVO website)

Alongside paying trustees, the creation of unitary boards is one of the most controversial issues of governance debate within the third sector. Traditional third sector governance models have a two tier board system – an executive board (with employed directors) and a more strategic non-executive board of trustees. In comparison, the most common structure within private sector governance is the unitary board – where non-executives and executives combine to form a single structure.

The most commonly stated advantages of a two-tier system are the importance of an objective governance structure (the non-exec board) which can both examine issues at a strategic level whilst also remaining free of management influence.

However, many ACEVO members have reported that they do not believe a two-tier system is the most effective method of governance for their organisations and would like to combine all or part of the two boards to increase efficacy. This potentially offers great strength in combining the strategic views of the trustees with the organisational knowledge of the executives. This inter-action works because those involved are Directors and share a joint responsibility with full accountability in law.

In 2007, ACEVO invited Sir Rodney Brooke, Chair of the General Social Care Council, to chair a Commission of Inquiry into governance in the third sector. Improvement governance was found to be a major issue for the sector and often not focussed on enough by individual organisations. Other key findings included a general lack of board appraisal or training, poor trustee diversity and concern over the transparency and capacity of the sector’s governance. The Commission of Inquiry suggested that organisations should review their governance arrangements, the board structure being one of them, to ensure effectiveness and suitability. ACEVO strongly believes that each organisation should be able to adopt its optimal governance structure and is actively campaigning on this matter to reduce regulatory concerns around conflicts of interest.

Own comment: ACEVO should now actively promote CEO’s on to main Boards.

Charities – Trustees and CEO’s

Should CEO’s of Charities in the UK be Trustees?

Some are very uneasy about the situation in most charities where CEO’s are not automatically a Trustee / Director. This situation is unusual – it is not found usually in business, where the CEO is almost always on the main board; it is not found in the Public sector (e.g. education – where the Head is an ex-officio member of the Board and other staff are on the Board); it is not normal in the US Charity sector where non-profits are expected to have the CEO on the board (a “heads on the line” approach).

This seems to be a singularly British charity approach which somehow confuses the fact that a CEO is paid with the fact that (in the UK) Trustees are not, as a reason not to have a CEO on the Board. In fact, as long as the Trustee is not paid for being a Trustee, there is nothing in UK law which prohibits the CEO from being a Trustee as long as Articles of Association do not prohibit it.

CEO unease

The reason that a CEO should be a Trustee is the same reason that everywhere else CEO’s are on the Board – to ensure that the person entrusted with the operational responsibility and much of the strategic responsibility is pro-active and party to decisions that impact that work, has an equal say and equal responsibility and is part of the team that is legally responsible. This is true in almost all other organisations and should be the same in the Charity sector in the UK.

The time many CEO’s take to make the decision to accept the CEO position is often at least partly due to this issue. Is there any sense whatsoever in the separation between the board and operational / strategic management? It provides in many charities with a “them and us” (which the separation makes real) and many CEO’s suffer (according to ACEVO – the Association for Chief Executives in Voluntary Organisations) as a result of the separation (apparently, 27 are receiving counselling from ACEVO!). In other cases, CEO’s, not part of the team, operate independently and can be seen to be control fixated as a result of the separation – ignoring the Board and attempting to run roughshod over it. Both situations are not tolerable.

Unease stems from the fact that no charity should operate in this way ……. but isn’t it time that the Charity sector wakes up  – gets up to date?

Charity Commission / ACEVO viewpoint

The Charity Commission seems to want to defend the status quo (where, according to an ACEVO report from 2007, around 5.2% of CEO’s were Trustees of their Charity).

The CC will, when asked, usually point out in a defensive way, the dangers of conflict of interest over salary and similar issues. This is overcome everywhere else where committees are set up independently of the CEO as required and where CEO’s are asked to leave the room if there is a conflict (as conflict would be dealt with for anyone in such a situation).

The CC seems to have no proper view on this issue but also points out bureaucratically to watch out that the Articles don’t prohibit the change – which most don’t and can easily be changed.

ACEVO is supposed to promote the views of charity CEO’s. I have not yet been impressed with its ability to properly do this formally and forcefully on this issue. It is OK to be a help group for CEO’s in trouble and to promote good governance but the limit of ACEVO’s efforts on this is to state the following on its website:

In a 2007 report:

There was support for the following initiatives:

1. A code of good practice on governance (98% chief executives, 95% chairs).

2. Regular review of governance practices by external experts (68% chief executives,58% chairs).

3. More flexibility with respect to board structures (50% chief executives and 33% chairs thought that chief executives should be voting trustees).

 It goes on with an article:

The role of the chief executive as a bridge – by Paddy Fitzgerald

In the third sector the general practice is for trustee boards where normally trustees are non-executive, chaired by an independent and with the chief executive, who is rarely a trustee, in attendance. Here the primary concerns of the trustees are the mission and future of the organisation, while shorter term issues are for the most part dealt with by a management committee chaired by the chief executive.

If this model is to work, the chief executive becomes the bridge between the future concerns of the trust and the short term issues of the management committee. Most importantly, the chief executive will be responsible for overseeing the journey from short to long term and in deploying management resources to explore this and identify the issues along the way. In this way the chief executive brings to the attention of the trust shorter term questions requiring resolution, and engages the executive staff in the consideration of longer term matters.

This is a much more powerful vision than one of the chief executive as a nontrustee passively awaiting the instructions of his or her board. The bridge role requires positive engagement with the ability to exert powerful advocacy in both trust and management committee, and as leadership becomes less and less a matter of autocratic direction and more and more a matter of persuasion and shared endeavour, so it becomes vital that the chief executive is an inclusive member of both trust and management committee.

 Trusts too should value the extra dimension provided by the sense of a unified team, and should welcome the chief executive as one of their own, for it is under these circumstances that the chief executive is most likely to engage other trustees most, chief executives cannot escape legal obligations placed on trustees since they will be judged as shadow directors with the same penalties in the event of any major problem, so it is in their interests to don the mantle of a Trustee and participate wholly.

 The conclusion may be that the formal appointment as a trustee aids the chief executive in this bridge role and is one of the defining characteristics of the third sector. Recognition of this role for the chief executive is essential to staff appraisal and through this to the management and leadership programmes aimed at staff development and management succession.

 On its FAQ’s – current – ACEVO lists the types of Board structure:

Q: What is the appropriate level of executive involvement in governance?

A: This relates to the structure of organisational boards. Board structures fall into four categories:

  1. The wholly executive board: found most often in small commercial companies. For obvious reasons, such boards usually struggle to offer any independent scrutiny of executive decisions. Such boards are rarely found in the non-profit sector, and it is unlikely that the Charity Commission would permit such a structure for registered charities.
  2. The two-tier board: found in parts of Europe, comprises a ‘supervisory board’ to represent stakeholder interests, and an ‘operational board’ to drive the organisation’s performance. Some charity boards may in practice resemble this structure, delegating operational decisions to a ‘senior management team’. However, a genuine operational board, unlike a senior management team, has a legally recognised governance role.
  3. The unitary board: classic model for business in the UK and Commonwealth countries, includes both executive and non-executive directors, with equal status. Despite the ambiguity concerning executive directors’ role, this model is recommended by many experts on corporate governance. The structure embodies the tension between conformance and performance. If working properly, it can combine executives’ detailed knowledge of the business with the more detached scrutiny of non-executives.
  4. The wholly non-executive board: found commonly in commercial companies based in the USA as well as in the British third sector. Third sector board member are usually, but not always, unpaid.
  5. Recognising that no one model will be perfect for every organisation, ACEVO recommends that its members conduct an audit of their governance arrangements, which should include an examination of governance structures as well as good practice.

ACEVO has not formally proposed a major change and has not acted on this serious issue – although it has a Reform Group which highlights the issue – http://www.acevo.org.uk/Policy+Advocacy/Activity/Governance . However, it is clear that the practice of CEO’s not being on the board is a serious deficiency and one that should be rectified across the board.

Sir Stephen Bubb is generally supportive and, in a recent note from him to me, he wrote the following:

“I absolutely agree with you on this issue. The Acevo board has appointed me to the Acevo board ex officio. It is the right approach and we have encouraged members to do this. Indeed it is part of our arguments and discussions with the CC that charities who want to take this approach should be enabled to do so. You are right on the legal issue as well , in my view. 

 

We will be pursuing this further as we are in the process of setting up a governance Commission to look at how the sector improves it structures and practises.

 

I feel strongly on this myself and indeed the potential chair of the commission is himself on his charity board. I am sorry this is not clearer on our website, though there are those members who take a contrary view when we last asked; but it was ever thus.

 

This issue will be addressed in our work and you can be sure that as the CEO I take the view we must sit on Boards for all the reasons you outline.”

Stephen Bubb

 

So, Charity CEO’s should work to get themselves on their Boards and start to campaign that this makes sense not just for themselves but for good governance and for the best interests of their Charities. As Paddy Fitzgerald wrote five years ago, Charity CEO’s probably already have the responsibility as shadow Directors in law – but, they do not have the legal power as Trustees to even enter into a vote on the issues closest to them and the charity.

CEO’s being outside the Board of Charities is a nonsense. Shouldn’t we change it?

I am a CEO of a Charity but not on the Board as well as a Chair of a large Academy in London where the Head is on the Board and I am involved in setting up a Charity where I will be a Trustee and where the CEO will be on the Board. It is for each Charity to decide, but if ACEVO is supportive, then the Charity Commission should be persuaded to change its basic antipathy to this issue and be supportive of CEO’s becoming Trustees. This would provide the confidence to Trustees of existing Charities who are currently reluctant to support this.

Schools get fleeced – and we all watch

The Bureau of Investigative Journalism recently published an article (http://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/2012/09/25/schools-fleeced-by-it-scammers/comment-page-1/#comment-9117) following the exposure on Panorama (BBC 1) that schools in the UK had been “fleeced” by IT companies (“scammers”). The article and Panorama drew attention to schools which are burdened by the need to run themselves as businesses and are often ill-equipped to do so when set against the complicated requirements of funding, procurement, suppliers and the like.

 

The BIJ summed up the problem with the thought that the FMSiS (Financial Management Standard in Schools) had been wrongly abolished and that the Government should think again. It was abolished after it had become a paper ticking exercise as reported by the Government in 2010 in their White Paper – “The Importance of Teaching” – http://www.education.gov.uk/inthenews/inthenews/a0067711/government-announces-end-of-complex-school-financial-reporting-tool.

 

The BIJ article missed the fact that most of the schemes that Panorama reported on were entered into while the FMSiS was in place!

 

Why is Finance so hard for non-profits (public and private sector)?

 

This does not just happen in Schools – it happens wherever greater knowledge is brought to bear.

 

So, the banks have run out of control and, five years’ later, we remain stunned that the financial regulators did not see this coming – or even understand the huge range of sub-prime schemes, poor management controls, over-leveraging, bad morality, lack of risk aversion, inability for banks to fail, dislike of customers and similar.

 

In the same way, companies like Enron fooled their highly paid auditors (some of whom connived with them) – we never learned much from that or from the countless, other financial scams that have been served up on unsuspecting publics since at least the south Sea Bubble in 1720 and for thousands of years before.

 

But, we expect more from public sector and the third sector organisations that supposedly guard our taxes and donations. What makes it so hard for them to adequately ensure that the financial and support arms of those organisations are able to be a good as all those they work with?

 

Where the incentives are

 

Of course, much has been written about how the wealth potential of banks suck in those with the highest intelligence and motivation (and maybe those with the lowest ethics) and that the regulators are filled with those who cannot compete – maybe those who failed to make it in banking themselves.

 

Enron was full of highly motivated and driven people who bought into a scheme (or schemes) and worked like fury to implement their scam / scheme. The manipulation of an energy market was not understood by the regulators and auditors just as auditors and clients failed to understand how Bernie Madoff was making such returns on their “investments”.

 

In a money-driven economy, which has created tremendous wealth for society, there are, at the margins and even more in the centre, incentives provided to people that lure those who are massively motivated and driven to participate – to work 24 hours a day, to spend their time working up schemes to make money and their companies profitable. Business is a money-driven part of the economy in a way that the non-profit sectors (be they public or private sector) are not. The latter are full of people driven (and maybe just as motivated) by other things – a passion for human rights, for education, for people, for society – but not for the thing that drives those they may meet at the interface of private sector and the non-profits.

 

As Galbraith wrote in The Affluent Society, public goods are always at a disadvantage in a market-driven economy and the crucial problems always exist at the interface between the two.  I tackled this is a previous post – https://jeffkaye.wordpress.com/wp-admin/post.php?post=192&action=edit – and the inability of societies to establish how to provide the “social balance” to which Galbraith refers enables the problems to persist – such as the fleecing of schools in the UK.

 

Enabling the “social balance”?

 

The “social balance” (Galbraith ibid) is about how society reacts to private enterprise. The most obvious example is the automobile – private industry propels the development of cars but it is the public sector that provides the roads, traffic control and policing, emergency services and hospitals (usually), pollution control and similar. India is a great and recent example – http://uk.finance.yahoo.com/news/india-car-sales-soar-where-054302682.html. But, the ability of the private sector runs well ahead of the ability of the public sector to react.

 

Nowhere is this lack of social balance clearer than in the provision of expertise in “back office” areas in the public sector and in the third sector. While their front of office capabilities may be excellent, the non-profit sector cannot, in the main, recruit the best people (it cannot offer financial incentives to match anything like the private sector) and therefore its systems and processes fall well behind.

 

This is compounded by the continuous belief by government that they have to “do something” directly (like the FMSiS above) and in the third sector that anything spent outside of front end is a waste of money. Donors (whether governments, trusts and foundations, companies or individuals) suddenly have a different mindset as soon as they donate. How many would ask companies to stop spending on finance operations – yet, many donors insist that their donations can only be applied to front end work – the cause – and nothing to overheads. While it is good to keep overheads low, governance and financial management dictate that these “enabling” areas of any organization (like people management training) are as good as the front end operations so as not to stymie the work of the charity, NGO or pubic sector organization.

 

Having worked in all sectors (with most of my working life in the private sector) it is clear to me that the non-profit sectors are continuously starved of capability and expertise in the areas that could make them far more efficient and capable – not just to survive but also to enable far better work to be accomplished. If they work well it is in spite of the problems put in their way. Most don’t manage and the failures of the public sector to manage large IT projects, for example or the non-profit sector to survive continue.

 

So, how can the non-profits develop a response to the needed social balance so that they don’t get fleeced?

 

Pro-activity in the social balance

 

Governments and those who provide central governance to the non-profit sectors have undertaken so many actions and some have provided stability. But, each sector and those within it are challenged continuously.

 

What is needed is first, recognition that there is a problem. Each sector should assess where the main problems lie and government has to step up and signal that it will not do everything but begin to be the chief enabler for the non-profits. For example, restrictive funding for charities, whereby donors only provide money for front-end purposes, should not be allowed. The practice is akin to shareholders telling companies which part of the business their funding is allowed on. It is not a loan – it is a donation and restrictions mean more bureaucracy and less ability for the charity to manage itself.

 

If a donor believes that a charity spends too much on overheads, it can withhold donations just like a shareholder can invest elsewhere – but restricting funding in this way is counter-productive.

 

In the UK, this is something for the charities Commission and government to act on.

 

Second, there has to be a stepping up on ability – which will lead to improved processes and systems (although improvements in each need money as well and the proposal above is one way of directing more into this area).

 

This stepping up of ability should be driven by government who should require firms of accountants to do what the legal profession does – provide at least 2% pro-bono capability into non-profits. I have been highly impressed by law firms’ ability to do excellent pro-bono – less so by the finance industry.

 

CSR divisions of companies should also be driving their best finance people into non-profits – in a meaningful way to address the social imbalance.

 

Governments should look to reward those who go from the private sector into the public or third sector (even for a time) with tax incentives (much like students having to repay their student loans). It is not a great time to do this, but it would indicate a lot.

 

Third, the big accounting organisations should ensure that they focus more attention on public sector and third sector – understanding the problems and devising exams and maybe alternative paths to accreditation rather than the one-size-fits-all approach. Certainly, the CIPFA and IPSASB provide the basics for the public sector but the incentivisation for the best to go into that sector let alone education or charities / NGO’s is far less and the number of accountants that enter the charity sector (for example) with the same skill levels and drive as those in the private sector is small.

 

Fourth, trustees from private sector organisations have to become involved – not just from a governance standpoint but setting examples and putting the bar as high as it needs to go to make the enablers work. This is hands-on stuff not just remote governance.

 

Separate sectors, common interests

 

Except in a society where the three sectors don’t exist (e.g. communist states), the challenge is greatest at the intersections of society – where the sectors clash. Yet, as in the example of automobiles above (or any other transportation systems), different sectors live off each other – and the charity sector fills many of the gaps that society does not see fit to fill in private or public sectors.

 

The sectors need to be different, of course, but there does need to be a far better understanding of the problems that our economic structures throw up and how to deal with them or fleecing of our schools will recur but be seen to be a mere tip of the social iceberg.

 

 

 

 

Governance – From Osborne to Diamond – where is it?

If we wanted to see bad governance issues at their most raw – in all sectors of society – then maybe this was the week.

First – Corporate governance was shown to be completely awry at Barclays, where Bob Diamond’s testimony showed so clearly that non-execs that should have been applying governance strictures were so out of the picture.

Second – the public sector and education, where Michael Gove in a strange speech at FASNA (Freedom and Autonomy for Schools) said he knew what “good governance” looked like (fascinating to hear a politician talk about good governance!) and criticized many existing school boards as:

A sprawling committee and proliferating sub-committees. Local worthies who see being a governor as a badge of status not a job of work. Discussions that ramble on about peripheral issues, influenced by fads and anecdote, not facts and analysis. A failure to be rigorous about performance. A failure to challenge heads forensically and also, when heads are doing a good job, support them authoritatively.

Third – charities, where governance was held up at an ACEVO (Association of Chief Executives in Voluntary Organisations) conference to be a critical problem and the split between Chief Execs and Trustees very problematical (nearly 30 are seeking urgent advice from ACEVO on this issue).

Fourth – Government via the astonishing spat between Messrs. Osborne (our Chancellor of the Exchequer) and Ed Balls (his shadow) over banking and LIBOR – or worse, their obvious hatred for each other.

Across the nation – Governance in doubt

We clearly have a crisis of governance across the nation and in all sectors. Government, public sector, corporates and Third Sector all exhibit problems where real strains are showing and proper governance is often missing.

Gove’s comments (which show political mannerisms at their worst) can be spread across all areas if we want to.

The role of non-executive directors, trustees, governors or similar is crucial in organisations. Their importance is completely under-estimated in the same way that the importance of backbenchers in Parliament is. This showed so clearly in the Osborne / Balls playground fight this week and showed how dangerous it is when the Executive is a major part of the Legislature (as we have it in the UK) and back-benchers are unable to confront the over-weaning egos of the front-benchers.

The example shown here – of a senior government minister and his shadow in opposition – was appalling but, unfortunately, does shine a light on society. When recession strikes, the worst examples of society come to light.

What’s going wrong?

Much is actually right in sectors of society that organize themselves into such oganisations such as companies, public sector bodies and Third Sector organisations. But, there is a crucial link that is not sufficiently understood and where traditional rules don’t really work anymore – and, where they do work, are rubbished by politicians pursuing a political agenda.

The link is the one between senior operational staff and Boards. It is the crucial link in any organization.

Corporates

The danger here is the risk that Chief Executive Officers who have got where they are because they are good at what they do but also because they act like steamrollers, often force Boards to concede issues with too little scrutiny. Time is of the essence and information hard to take in when you are a Non-Executive Director (NED) maybe at many corporations and spend a few days a year on each.

The law now lays a heavy burden on NED’s but there remain many who want to bring their skills and knowledge and experience to companies. Most are acceptable to the CEO if they have good connections /networks. Beyond this, they are begrudgingly provided with data and fill remuneration and audit committees and the like, fulfilling a role but often not really involved with the central and driving forces behind the business. Government tinkering with the laws has prescribed the areas of involvement that the law requires and where NED’s have to focus. Areas that are fundamental, like strategy, culture, and ethics, are more likely to be left outside.

The danger becomes real in companies like Enron – which imploded under a Ponzi scheme that should have been obvious to all on the Board. It is endangering one of our best-known banks as it did with RBS and Lloyds-TSB.

Name the major scandals in corporates and then describe the efforts of NED’s to make things right – whether in newspapers and phone hacking, oil industry and health and safety, mining and corruption.

Public Sector

I use the example of schools / academies to show the reverse. Michael Gove, in seeking to set up an array of different schools so that the good ones can “emerge”, is in danger of wrecking education and the potential for good that exists in those schools / academies.

Of course, he was speaking at the FASNA – so, was amongst friends. But, his injudicious language threatens to throw out the good with the bad. I am a Chair of Directors / Governors at an excellent Academy and Gove runs the risk (as all “leaders” do) of demoralizing just the people he should be motivating.

In pursuing his political agenda, he shows he is full of ideas but not allied to the skills of a leader. Schools boards / or governing bodies are full of people who (unlike in corporates) are unpaid and fill positions out of a desire to help kids and the staff that run the schools. Gove is at least ten years out of date with his picture of local worthies – it is not just an insult but shows Gove to be stuck in the 1970’s at best.

At schools, the link between Head and Governors / directors can be bad (as it can in any situation) but is often very good. The role of the board as “critical friend” is enshrined in all that is done and the Head (and some of his / her staff) are on the Board as well. This creates a team that motivates each other to work together and develop a school for its students. Where it works (and it usually does to some extent), it provides enthusiasm as well as governance, skills as well as motivation – on both sides, operational and governance.

Of course, Gove has some insights as schools in difficult areas will have trouble finding the skills needed to fill a board. But, this is down to the location and the need to ensure that they are supported within a structure that works. This is a key area and where successful schools can certainly help.

But, Gove should not ridicule the governance structure in schools – it may be the one area that does work!

Third Sector

Now, I work in this sector as a CEO. I have a good Board but having been in the sector for five years or so (my previous 30 were in the corporate one), it is clear that there is a crisis and it is between CEO’s and the Board.

There is a divide that is unnecessary and needs to be fixed. My concern is that it won’t be because the mind-set of third sector participants is that the charity sector is precious and that there needs to be a separation between boards and operations.

The separation is, I am repeatedly told, because of conflicts of interest. These conflicts, if a CEO becomes a Trustee, means, for example, that the roles are somehow confused and that the Chief Exec can no longer properly comment on staff salary issues because of conflicts of interest (see NCVO website).

The Charities Commission is completely confused. Two requests for information on this yielded completely different responses in the last couple of weeks – both suggested a board would need to ensure no conflicts of interest but while one said they would need to approve the appointment and one did not, neither could attest to the specific conflicts that would be in evidence.

What this means is that the separation (which does not happen in Education – and a school is no less precious) is maintained for little reason and the huge benefits – teamwork, joint motivation, openness for example – are lost in the preciousness.

It needs to change and fast.

Governance and Government

Our government shows itself adrift in its response to good governance by the way it shows itself in parliament. Having the Executive commanding the legislature is bad enough but requires a more magisterial quality. Osborne and Balls would not know that if it hit them between the eyes.

It is important that organisations are properly run. They have an enormous impact on society and are a key part of it. It can be argued that civil society has lost its control over organisations as government (our supposed defenders) has clearly shown no tendency to take itself seriously. Osborne and Gove are poor exemplars.

There may be no excuse for the rioters of last summer in England, but the tendency of organisations to show lack of leadership is troublesome and leadership is needed.

The future of Governance

Sectors of society like the three (or maybe four) mentioned above work in silos and come up against each other from time to time. There is much in common and governance issues affect each and all of them.

Governance is the method of governing – it applies to us nationally, internally and within organisations to which most of us belong. Good governance is crucial to the way society works but it is under threat.

The future of society depends on good governance and we now need to unravel the workings of a hundred years of legal doctrine to develop improvements throughout all the sectors of our society.

We need structures that combine strategy and operations, directors / trustees / governors and business / organizational leaders, but where the non-executives are provided with the skills and time to address the concerns that society has.

At the same time, Chief Execs need to be able to explain the key drivers that make (in their view) the organization work and non-execs should be able to investigate for themselves.

Gove wants Ofsted to rigorously assess governors in the way they monitor Heads. Fine (if they had any understanding of what that means and the ability to do it) but who is doing this in corporates – maybe the auditors or some other independent body for any publicly listed company?

Finally, different sectors should not be isolated from each other. NEDs, trustees, governors have a lot in common but all operate to completely separate rules and guidelines. It is time for some common dialogue as civil society (which includes everyone) is getting pretty sick and tired of the mess that organisations are in.